

# Notes

## Introduction and Overview. The Resurgence of Agrarian Reform in the Twenty-first Century

1. Indeed, many urban problems as well have their origins in displacement and in rural–urban migration due to landlessness in the countryside.

2. Those regions outside of the large industrial nations of the northern hemisphere; also referred to as the Third World or less developed countries (LDCs).

3. The early small farmers of the US came from privileged European stock and/or took land that had not been held by colonial powers prior to their arrival. These farmers' tie to the land was one of convenience and legal maneuvering against Native Americans. There was no landed aristocracy and there was no relationship that resembled, even remotely, the European feudalism that was exported to the Global South. See Clark (1990).

4. Figures for landlessness are often based on estimates and are difficult to measure due to problems with sampling, rural–urban migration, and the informal relationships between landless dwellers and land. In 2000, estimates of landlessness around the world were reported at about 100 million.

5. At its core, “food sovereignty” is defined throughout this volume as the prioritization of food production by peasant and family farms for domestic and local market, using diverse ecological production methods. In addition to this focus on small producers, Rosset (see conclusion in this volume) elaborates on the importance of ensuring access to natural resources, fair prices, gender equity, seed protection and public expenditure toward these ends.

6. “Economism” is defined here as a reduction of society and human interaction to a series of cost-benefit analyses, and the conscious efforts by individuals, groups, and nations to maximize their utility through market exchange.

7. The categories of small producer, small farmer, and peasant farmer are used interchangeably within the literature on rural development and land reform.

While the literature does not always distinguish among the three groupings, there is a general consensus that these refer to those producers who are dependent on the smallest landholdings (usually less than 10 hectares of land) within a given society.

8. These calculations are based on data from INE 2003 only.

9. Two central definitions of efficiency inform economic thinking. Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a situation in which no change in resources can be made without making someone worse off. This situation clearly tilts against redistributive land reform; any case in which a landowner, deprived of land for redistributive purposes, can claim to be worse off, makes the system non-Pareto efficient. The second kind of efficiency, allocative efficiency, has a broader definition: a system is allocatively efficient if resources are optimized in such a way as to maximize the net benefit attained through their use. Again, though, the World Bank's understanding of the benefit to be achieved in the domain of land redistribution tends to remain narrowly defined and short in scope, excluding broader values of equity, justice, or social change.

10. [www.viacampesina.org](http://www.viacampesina.org).

11. For a good discussion of this issue, see Williams (1994) and Brockett (1998, 101–6).

12. It is not sufficient to explain the Soviet experience as simply a cause and effect relationship between “large-scale bias” and the destruction of the peasantry. Resnick and Wolff (2002) have made a good case for considering the distorted class analysis of the Soviet Communist Party during the early part of the twentieth century in any evaluation of the policies that took place during that time. The problem was not just one of anti-peasant bias, but a distorted view of how the full transition to socialism was accomplished. An inaccurate analysis of the rural sector led to a great deal of misdirected policies that originated with, and were perpetuated by, a false belief that the Soviet Union had already arrived at communism (i.e., a “classless” society with a proletarian majority).

13. This team, led by Raj Patel, included Michael Courville, Julia Clarke, and Paulina Novo, with expertise contributed by Peter Rosset.

14. Land reform was conceptualized as a systematic redistribution or retitling of land on a large scale, which transfers arable land to landless beneficiaries and serves as a leveling mechanism for wealth concentration in rural areas.

15. These nations were selected for their historical importance. Time constraints prevented a full global examination of land reform, with attention focused on states that are either directly involved in the LRAN project or are of importance to LRAN partners. Resource constraints also prevented the exploration of units of analysis that were not nation states. For this reason, certain kinds of land reform remain invisible to this analysis, and there are important omissions, including but not limited to Nicaragua, Tanzania, West Africa, and the Middle East. Despite these limitations, the authors believe the analysis to be of some merit.

16. While the primary period of our evaluation begins in 1945, China,

Guatemala, Mexico, and the former Soviet Union had ongoing reform movements and policies prior to the World War II period. They have been included because of the scope of land reform efforts and continued significance of land reform in economic and political planning during the period of study.

17. In the summer of 2005, Zimbabwe's President Mugabe had implemented a sweeping forced eviction in urban areas known as "Operation Murambatsvina" ("Clean up the Filth"). The professed goal of this initiative was to relocate poor urban dwellers to rural areas through force, if necessary. In an instant, thousands of Zimbabweans became homeless, landless dwellers. The implications of this forced relocation were only beginning to be observed in the fall of 2005. Many of those evicted from urban homes were those who had left rural areas in earlier years to flee from violence during the 2000 national elections and to escape persistent drought. The immediate results of the Mugabe administration's policy were observable human rights abuses, increased landlessness, hunger, and rural poverty. This incident further highlights the persistent struggle of the landless to find stable, safe residence within their own nation, even after sweeping land reform policy was implemented only a few years earlier.

## Chapter 1: The Agrarian Question in Guatemala

1. Referring to those farmers who have made investments in land, machinery, agricultural technology, and/or fixed irrigation systems.

2. Estimates of poverty in Guatemala vary. The World Bank (WB) estimates that in 2000, 66 percent of the total population lived in poverty, including 86 percent of the rural population and 93 percent of the indigenous population. The figures given here are the most recent figures cited by the UN Mission in Guatemala, May 2000.

3. Perera (1993) notes the link in Guatemala between land tenure and health, in which landless families were shown to have much higher infant mortality rates (278).

4. Migration due to insufficient landholdings has also been cited as a source for loss of cultural identity and community (Katz 2000).

5. Descendants of Spanish colonial families who married indigenous Guatemalans and come from a mixed ethnic heritage.

6. Large landed estates held by one owner or a family, and specializing in agricultural export production.

7. Coffee, cotton, citronella, lemon, tea, bananas, sugarcane, tobacco, rubber, quinine, fruit, hay, beans, cereals, and other commercial crops.

8. Leading up the 1952 reform, tax evasion, undervaluation of land for tax purposes, overvaluation for forced sales, and the nonenforcement of progressive taxation of idle lands were common problems. As will be discussed below, these problems remain in present-day Guatemala, and present serious obstacles for the successful implementation of a market-based land reform.

9. Thiesenhusen (1995) characterized the potential beneficiaries of the Arbenz

reform as “unorganized”; this notion is disputed by Forster (1998) who argues that the 1944–54 period was a time of growing mobilization for land and labor rights among labor, campesino, and indigenous organizations.

10. For the larger discussion and details of the implementation of Arbenz’s land reform program, his subsequent overthrow, and the reversal of land awards, see especially Schlesinger and Kinzer (1982); Paz C (1986); Cambranes (1992), Handy (1994); and Thiesenhusen (1995).

11. The wording of the law’s title, “transformation” (rather than “land reform”), reflects the relative taboo on discussion of agrarian reform in the post-Arbenz era.

12. Farmers were expected to compensate the government at a rate of 5 percent of total crop value for a period of twenty-five years.

13. Figures do not include permanently employed plantation workers.

14. Even though he was known as a reformer, Cerezo recognized his lack of power vis-à-vis the military and the rural landowning elite, commenting that “if we institute reform measures that affect private enterprise and don’t take the army into account, we shall be overthrown; and if we attack the army without having the business sector on our side, the result would be the same” (Perera 1993, 282).

15. The 1956, 1965, and 1985 constitutions took a step back on authorizing land expropriation for agrarian reform, limiting the application of provisions to appropriate unused lands (Sandoval 1987).

16. Between 1970 and 1981, INTA received 5,334,000 Quetzales in payment for distributed frontier lands, while only receiving 602,000 Quetzales in idle land tax. In any case, only 263 large landholdings were assessed the idle land tax between 1963 and 1972, most of which were exonerated from payment by 1972 and 1973 government decrees (Sandoval 1987).

17. The political climate against discussion of agrarian issues was so harsh that even a 1988 Episcopal letter from the Archbishops of Guatemala that called for a study of the land distribution problem faced extreme censure from the large landowner organizations (Stringer and Lambert 1989, 16).

18. The failures of FONTIERRAS have been chronicled by Byron Garoz and Susana Gauster at [www.landaction.org/category.php?section=25](http://www.landaction.org/category.php?section=25).

## Chapter 2: An Introduction to Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe

1. A term from Zimbabwean history that refers to a struggle for justice, a large uprising of popular sentiment, or a struggle for independence.

## Chapter 3: Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa

1. Tribal homelands of indigenous Africans as designated by the South African government during the apartheid era.

2. The population estimates by the Central Statistical Services (CSS) and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) were 41.9 million and 44.7 million respectively. The reason for the disparities has been that the DBSA adjusted its figures to take into account an undercounting in the 1991 census. The 1994 estimates by CSS and DBSA were similar, 40.7 million and 40.6 million respectively.

3. CSS claims that the previous population estimates were overstated and that the current estimates have corrected for the overestimation.

4. The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) estimated the rural population to be 21.05 million in 1993, and the October Household Survey (by CSS) put the rural population at 21.01 million.

5. The CSS preliminary estimates for 1996, however, indicated a higher figure of 88 percent of the population in Northern Province as rural.

6. Until 1995, South Africa was divided into four states: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. Better known as TBVC states, they were essentially self-governing territories or homelands. The TBVC states had independent status within the apartheid government of South Africa, but they were usually not recognized by the international community.

7. A Gini-coefficient of 1 implies absolute concentration of income and a coefficient of 0 implies absolute equality.

#### Chapter 4: Land Reform in India: Issues and Challenges

1. A system of land tenure in which the agricultural land of a village or group of villages is owned by one person or a group of joint owners. The owners were known as zamindars, and they were the primary link between the colonial government and the farmers working the land. Historically, the zamindars were tied to the interests of the British Crown and usually negotiated work agreements that aimed to strengthen the profitability of the colonial enterprise.

2. Jajmani is an informal system of personal obligations, hereditary occupational duties, obligatory payments, and familial relationships that is often bounded by caste and class status. There has been some disagreement over the degree of formality that should be related to the practices of jajmani, and the function of these relationships in the rural class structure across different regions and areas throughout India (Mayer 1993).

3. This includes, but is not limited to, such methods as increased mechanization; development and widespread use of artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides; an emphasis on economies of scale through larger field and farm size; continuous cropping; and developments in livestock, plant breeding, and biotechnology.

4. The World Bank's involvement in the green revolution began in 1964 when it sent a mission headed by Bernard Bell to India. The Bell mission called for a devaluation of Indian currency, the liberalization of trade controls, and greater emphasis on chemical- and capital-intensive agriculture.

5. The World Bank started to fund the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project in 1985. However, in 1993 the World Bank announced a withdrawal of all their funding for the dam citing "project irregularities" as the impetus for their decision. For a good discussion of the dam project see Gadgil 1995.

6. The World Bank currently has outstanding commitments worth about US\$20 billion in water projects, of which US\$1.7 billion is marked for rural water schemes, US\$5.4 billion for irrigation, and the rest for other purposes, such as

urban water supply and hydropower development. South Asia receives 20 percent of Bank water loans.

7. The International Development Bank (IDA) is the soft-lending arm of the World Bank, providing interest-free assistance to the poorest countries.

8. Approximately one billion inhabitants in India as of 2000.

9. It is generally accepted that, in many countries, inequities associated with land have led to rebellions by the oppressed. Feudal land tenure systems and the struggle of peasants for rights to land were the key factors in the French Revolution, for example, while the American Civil War was a conflict over land and slavery.

## Chapter 5: The Underlying Assumptions, Theory, and Practice of Neoliberal Land Policies

1. See, e.g., Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Lipton 1974.

2. See, e.g., Byres 1974b, 2004b; Bernstein 2002, 2004b.

3. See, e.g., Paige 1975; Migdal 1988.

4. See, e.g., Ross 1998; Putzel 1992; Walinsky 1977.

5. See Ghose 1983; Kay 1983; Herring 1983; Harriss 1993.

6. Tannenbaum 1929; Sanderson 1984; Salamini 1971; Urioste 2001; Handy 1994.

7. Refer to the discussions in World Bank 2003. De Soto (2000) has also inspired this mainstream thinking.

8. See, e.g., Korovkin 2000; Yashar 1999; Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004; Vidal 2004.

9. For a general background, refer to the important works of Deere and León 2001a; Agarwal 1994; Razavi 2003a; Kabeer 1995.

10. For a general background on the Salvadoran case, see J. Pearce 1998; Foley 1997; Diskin 1989. For the South African experience, see Levin and Weiner 1997; Cousins 1997.

11. For fresh analytic insights, see Pons-Vignon and Lecomte 2004.

12. For Indonesia, see Aspinal 2004; Lucas and Warren 2003; Tsing 2002. For the Philippines, see Franco 2001; Riedinger 1995; Lara and Morales 1990. For Brazil, see Houtzager 2000. For other Latin American cases, see Fox 1990.

13. For further discussion on the changing global context of land reform today, see Herring 2003; Ghimire 2001a, 2005; de Janvry, Platteau et al. 2001; Zoomers and van der Haar 2000; Fortin 2005.

14. This can also be seen as part of the state's continuing effort to, in the words of James Scott 1998, "simplify" or make "legible" complex social relationships, data, and information especially in "non-state spaces."

15. For general background, see Banerjee 1999; Gordillo 1997, 12–19; Carter 2000; Carter and Salgado 2001; and Carter and Mesbah 1993.

16. For Brazil, see Deere and Medeiros 2005; Sauer 2003; Borras 2002. For Colombia, see Mondragón 2003. For South Africa, see Levin and Weiner 1997; Lahiff 2003; Greenberg 2004. For the Philippines, see Borras 2005. For related dis-

cussion in Zimbabwe, see Moyo 2000; Lahiff and Cousins 2001. For Egypt, see Bush 2002. For general global critical discussions, see Herring 2003; Putzel 2002; Riedinger, Yang, and Brook 2001; El-Ghonemy 2001; Ghimire 2005; Borrás, Kay, and Akram Lodhi 2005; Borrás 2003b, 2003c.

17. See FoodFirst Information and Action Network and La Via Campesina 2003a; Baranyi, Deere, and Morales 2004; Paasch 2003; and Borrás 2004b. The World Bank land policies have also influenced, to varying degrees, the land policies of other international development institutions such as the European Union see, e.g., Monsalve Suárez 2004.

18. See, e.g., Spoor 1997, 2003; Akram Lodhi 2004, 2005.

19. Refer to, e.g., Borrás 2003a; Borrás, Reyes, and Carranza 2005.

20. See, e.g., Nuijten 2003 for Mexico's ejido; see also Carter and Salgado 2001.

21. For a more elaborate conceptual discussion, see Borrás 2004a.

22. See, e.g., El-Ghonemy 2001; Thiesenhusen 1995; Kay 1998; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Wright and Wolford 2003; Wolford 2003.

23. Refer to the works of Bratton 1990; Moyo 2000; Matondi and Moyo 2003; Palmer 2000.

24. For a recent discussion, see Borrás, Kay, and Akram Lodhi 2005.

25. See, e.g., Kay 2002b; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Tai 1974; also see Spoor 2002.

26. Refer to Borrás 2005; Franco 2005; de la Rosa 2005; Feranil 2005.

27. See Deere and Medeiros 2005; Barros, Sauer, and Schwartzman 2003; see also Buainain et al. 1999; Rosset 2001b.

28. See, e.g., Kay 2001; Scott 1985; Scott and Kerkvliet 1986; Kerkvliet 1993.

29. For a background on this case, see Gutierrez and Borrás 2004.

30. See, e.g., Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Stiglitz 2002, 81; El-Ghonemy 1990; Ghose 1983; Borrás, Kay, and Akram Lodhi 2005; Kay 2002b.

31. But see also Forero 1999, Mondragón 2003, and Borrás 2003b.

32. Refer to the critical works of Griffin 1980; Slater 1989; Bernstein 1998; Mamdani 1996; Boone 1998.

33. See, e.g., Tannenbaum 1929; Sanderson 1984; Salamini 1971; Grindle 1986; Herring 1983, 1990.

34. See, e.g., Thiesenhusen 1995; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; King 1977; Herring 1983; Tuma 1965.

35. See, e.g., Carter and Mesbah 1993; Carter and Salgado 2001.

36. See, e.g., Griffin 1976; Byres 1974, 224; Kay 1998, 2002b; Lehmann 1974; Lipton 1974, 1993.

37. See, e.g., Putzel 2002; Franco 1999, 2000.

38. See, e.g., Buainain et al. 1999; Navarro 1998; Barros, Sauer, and Schwartzman 2003; Borrás 2002.

39. See, e.g., Deere and Medeiros 2005; Sauer 2003; Borrás 2002, 2003b.

40. See, e.g., Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Putzel 1992.

41. Refer also to Bello with de Guzman 2001.

42. See, e.g., the persuasive arguments by Harriss 1982, 16; see also 2002.

43. Refer to Putzel 1992; Sobhan 1993; Christodoulou 1990; Walinsky 1977; Lehmann 1974; Bernstein 2002; Thiesenhusen 1995; King 1977; Tuma 1965.

44. For further discussion on this argument, see Borrás 2004a.

45. Among the relevant critical works in this regard are Deere 1985; Deere and León 2001a; Bernstein 2002, 2003, 2004; Byres 1974, 2004b; Lipton 1993; Ghimire 2001a; Dorner 1992; de Janvry 1981; Kay 1998, 2004; Thiesenhusen 1989, 1995; Hirtz 1998; Herring 1983, 2003; Grindle 1986; Razavi 2003a; Borrás, Kay, and Akram Lodhi 2005.

## Chapter 6: Thailand's Land Titling Program: Securing Land for the Poor?

1. The program was awarded a World Bank Award for Excellence in 1997.

2. CIA, *The World Factbook*, [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/th.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/th.html).

3. The phases and regions covered by the land titling project are: Phase 1: Northeastern region (southern 33 percent of the area) and Upper Northern region (western 50 percent). Phase 2: Lower Northern and Central region (16 provinces of high-value rural land), Northeastern region (6 provinces), and Eastern Seaboard region. Phase 3: Northeastern (remaining 10 provinces, Northern (remaining 7 provinces), and Central regions (2 provinces). Phase 4: Southern region, yet to begin implementation. The World Bank has suspended loans for the fourth phase, as the government will use own revenue for future implementation of the program.

4. An estimated 10 million people are living and farming in the national forest reserve areas as well as in many protected forest areas. A draft community forestry bill, giving legal recognition to the role of these forest-dependent communities and their sustainable management of forests, has been an issue of debate in parliament since the early 1990s.

5. The Rally for Rights (by the Assembly of the Poor, a broad coalition of farmers and village groups from all over Thailand) in front of Government House in Bangkok in 1997 highlighted 121 cases of state officials issuing illegal titles all over the country. A committee of the Assembly of the Poor has investigated these cases and submitted the evidence to the government.

6. Women do not appear to have been prejudiced by the process of the formalization of land rights in Thailand. The civil and commercial code protects women by requiring each spouse to consent in the sale of property. The Department of Lands registration processes have respected this position, requiring spousal consent to a transfer of rights regardless of who is registered on the title. However, no formal studies have been undertaken to investigate the impact of the program on women.

7. The full quote reads: "The findings of a 1980 sector strategy review might suggest that land administration was not a priority area for Bank intervention. First, land tenure in Thailand was relatively secure, based on a homesteading tradition that allows any citizen to claim up to four hectares to provide for his family. Second, landholdings were relatively equal, with many small and few large land-

holders, and no apparent trend toward increasing property concentration. Third, as a result of these factors, the country did not have a large landless population. And fourth, farmers' access to credit was relatively good and getting better. Thus, based on the sector review, there was little scope or justification for the Bank to give priority to land administration."

8. The property boom has resulted in a major rise in government revenue from registration (in 2001 the Department of Lands received an average revenue of approximately US\$90 per transaction). Burns, a consultant to the LTP program, stated that a key indicator of the program's success was that better land records systems and new technology such as the Internet have contributed to increased land market activity. He cites an article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Kanwerayotin 2001), which observed that "[b]uyers are demanding better quality, and can do their research more thoroughly, thanks to online registration records and home-buying guides on the [W]eb. Buyers who used to spend six months driving around to make inquiries can now find the information online within hours. And they bargain hard, their purchasing power enhanced by low interest rates and cut-throat competition among banks to give them housing loans." If such indicators are indeed key, it seems the program's focus on empowering the poor was lost somewhere after the initial planning stages.

## Chapter 7: Land Concentration in Mexico after PROCEDE

1. Despite the importance of the topic—for it is the axis of the new agrarian structure, and as such it is essential to an understanding the current situation of peasants and of the countryside—the available quantitative official information neither allows for a complete analysis nor a thorough examination of more detailed aspects. The main evaluations of PROCEDE, using data from 1994 and 1997 (de Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997, 1998) and in 2001 (Deininger et al. 2001; Lavadenz and Deininger 2001) using privileged information inaccessible to the public, have been written from the perspective of the reform's planners and promoters, with very little self-criticism. The independent studies that address particular aspects of PROCEDE, such as those of Appendini (2001) and others, published in the magazine *Estudios Agrarios*, or the study coordinated by Concheiro and Roberto Diego (2001), which explain PROCEDE's impact on the land market through case studies, have been used as this paper's main secondary sources of information.

2. And 65 percent of the country's forests are property of ejidos and indigenous communities. Gonzalez Pacheco (1981), cited in Merino (2001).

3. A 75 percent quorum is necessary for making the decision to privatize, but this number is reduced to 50 percent if the matter is taken to a second or third assembly. Once the legal quorum is reached, only 50 percent plus one, among members of an ejido, is required to permit privatization.

4. Material in this section is taken from *Estructura Agraria* based on information generated by PROCEDE through July 1996. The data pertain to more than 725,000 ejidatarios from 10,000 ejidos, which represent 20.5 percent of the coun-

try's ejidatarios and 37.5 percent of the ejidos. PROCEDE's results attest to the agrarian diversity that is present in the countryside, given that it has information of at least one certified ejido in each of the 1,448 municipalities, in the 196 Districts of Rural Development (DDR).

## Chapter 9: The World Bank's Market-Based Land Reform in Brazil

1. The research was carried out by Francisco Amaro Alencar, Guiomar Germani, João Francisco de Souza, Paulo Roberto Faccion, and Romildo dos Santos Silva, who coordinated the survey of data and the drafting of state reports.

2. The study presents calculations of the potential number of beneficiaries of land reform done by several agents involved in the struggle: in 1971, José Gomes da Silva estimated there were 2.43 million families; the 1985 PNRA proposal put the number between 6 and 7 million families; and in 1993 the MST estimated there were 3.039 million families that would be potential beneficiaries of land reform.

3. Under pressure from social movements and from international public opinion, the present government created the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and implemented a settlement policy that granted land to approximately 240,000 families in the course of four years, according to official data, although this figure is contested by rural social movements.

4. These funds, worth €218.2 million, were approved through the project appraisal document under the title Land-Based Poverty Alleviation Project I.

5. *Cédula* loans are composed of two subprojects, one with funds to purchase land (SAT) and the other to implant community social infrastructure (SIC). The latter uses World Bank grant funds for community projects, meaning that the families are not obliged to pay—but since it is a loan, Brazil has to pay the World Bank.

6. This imposition of collective areas was not observed in projects studied in the state of Ceará. On the contrary, collective areas were created by the decisions of families that acquired land through the *Cédula da Terra* program (as in the case of land reform settlements) and that included a cultural element in the organization of their projects.

7. In addition to organizing production (through division of land into individual lots and collective areas), the implementing agencies impose a certain form of social organization by building *agrovilas* (with houses not located on the lots as peasants are accustomed) to facilitate (make cheaper) the building of infrastructure (electric power, roads, schools, etc.).

## Chapter 10: Gender and Land

1. The lengthier original version of this chapter, with a fuller treatment of institutional politics, is available online in Spanish and English at [www.landaction.org](http://www.landaction.org).

2. This section is based primarily on Desmarais 2003a. Currently, La Via Campesina brings together close to 150 organizations from eight regions: Africa, Central America, North America, South America, the Caribbean, South Asia, Northeast and Southeast Asia, and Europe. Each region elects two representatives,

a woman and a man, to La Via Campesina's International Coordinating Committee, the executive organ of the movement, in addition to the International Operative Secretary.

3. It could be said that food sovereignty is a political concept, while the right to food is a juridical concept. For a detailed comparison of these two concepts, see Windfuhr and Jonsén 2005.

4. For an account of the GCAR and its principal forms of action, see Borrás 2004a.

5. The GCAR has been supported by the Land Research Action Network (LRAN) since the year 2000. Recently, LRAN and the GCAR have intensified their cooperation, through the representation of GCAR staff within LRAN and vice versa.

6. The Emergency Network is one of the main instruments of the GCAR for promoting solidarity with all peasant women and men who are victims of human rights violations. The Network intervenes internationally with letters of protest when peasant groups suffer violations of their right to food or their civil rights due to their struggle for land. The Network comprises members of La Via Campesina, sections and coordinating offices of FIAN, and organizations and people who sympathize with the GCAR. See FoodFirst Information and Action Network and La Via Campesina 2003b.

7. Land administration policies cadastre, registry, demarcation, entitlement, etc., enforced in the past few years with the endorsement of the World Bank, have not contributed to a higher degree of security in the tenancy of land by women or poor rural communities. On the contrary, in many cases such policies have made them more vulnerable to the loss of their land. In order to fully understand the effects of these land administration policies, it is necessary to analyze them in conjunction with agrarian and agricultural policies and with the general macroeconomic context; what we then observe is that with the promise of regularizing, formalizing, and making the tenancy of land more secure, processes of land entitlement were initiated—in most cases on an individual basis—while, simultaneously, agrarian commerce was liberalized and the state began to dismantle its support services for small- and medium-scale agriculturalists. The consequent bankruptcy of many farmers, who had counted on title deeds now alienable and subject to embargo, allowed creditor banks to keep those lands. In other cases, adverse conditions for the peasant family economy, the impossibility of producing, and, concomitantly, the dramatic deterioration of living conditions have forced many peasants to sell their lands to large agro-exporters to have a few ephemeral pesos in their pockets. On the effects of titling programs, see El-Ghonemy 2001 and chapter 6 in this volume.

8. The Cochabamba Declaration picked up this debate in the following form: "During the last few years women's movements have achieved in some countries a formal advancement in terms of gender equity within policies of access to land, which shaped processes of constitutional and legal reform. However, the neoliberal policies that unleashed processes of reconcentration of lands and resources in

few hands pulverized this achievement. We observed that in many cases formal advancements in gender equity tend to benefit middle-class women; thus the importance of understanding how race, class, ethnicity, and gender combine to impede the fulfillment of our rights, as poor, indigenous, peasant, and black women” (FoodFirst Information and Action Network and La Via Campesina 2003b).

9. In Colombia, for example, “peasant reserves” are a particular form of land tenancy inspired by the experience of indigenous peoples. The 2002 Proyecto de Ley 107, drafted by peasant organizations to promote new policies for agrarian reform and the reconstruction of the agrarian sector, sought to strengthen and broaden peasant reserves as a central element of that strategy.

10. The Cochabamba Declaration states in this respect: “The human right to land and to feed oneself is a consecrated right of every woman and man. To guarantee women’s access to and control over land we will struggle for the coownership of land, or the individual guarantee to the man and the woman, be it within collective/communal or individual forms of land tenancy. The effective guarantee of women’s access to land has to address legal, institutional, cultural, and structural exclusion mechanisms.”

11. The Movimiento de Mujeres Campesinas de Brasil (MMC), for example, has developed a clear vision of gender, class, and popular project (see Movimiento de Mujeres Campesinas de Brasil 2004).

12. Agarwal pinpoints four basic concepts regarding the importance of gender and the right to land: efficiency, welfare, equality, and empowerment (Agarwal 1994). Different authors emphasize and elaborate on one or another justification.

13. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, demands that states apply basic criteria in the observance of economic, social, and cultural rights. Among these criteria are the immediate guarantee of the core content of rights. In the case of the right to food, the core content is to be free from hunger, nondiscrimination, the participation of affected groups in the design of public policies, the obligation to identify and protect vulnerable groups, the use of maximum available resources to meet rights obligations, and the obligation of progressiveness as opposed to retrogressiveness in the observance of rights. Based on these criteria, it could be demanded that the state identify sex-specific need for land; that it draft, with the real and effective participation of those affected, an agrarian reform plan with verifiable goals of how many women and men will be provided land within what period of time; and that it create independent monitoring mechanisms and organizations to keep vigilance over the implementation of the programs, guaranteeing the equal participation of women in those organisms.

14. In the opinion of the Italian jurist, Luigi Ferrajoli, “[. . .] the simultaneous crisis of the state of rights the welfare state, and the nation state today requires a rethinking of the bases of constitutionalism, that is, of the bases of the rigid guarantees imposed constitutionally on all powers in defense of fundamental rights.

It is true that historically the guarantees of these rights were born into and, until now, have remained bound to the form [ . . . ] of the sovereign state as ‘the state of rights.’ But this historical nexus between state and fundamental rights is contingent, because the paradigm of the state of rights as guarantor is applicable to any legal code. This crisis can be overcome in a progressive sense only if the seats of constitutional guarantees are transferred to the new political and decisional seats, and the entire system of legal sources is correlatively reformed, reinforcing local autonomies with an inversion of the hierarchy of legal sources that guarantees the system’s primacy with respect to that of the state; democratizing and subjecting to new constitutional bonds the various seats of international power; placing the guarantees of fundamental rights at the summit of the entire system of legal sources, and therefore definitively withdrawing them from the market as well as from politics—local, state, international[ . . . ]” (Ferrajoli 1999; author’s translation).

### Part Three: Introduction

1. Henry Seragih (Indonesian Federation of Peasant Unions (FSPI), personal communication, 2005).
2. João Pedro Stédile, MST leader, personal communication, 2003.

### Chapter 13: Land for People Not for Profit in Venezuela

1. Chavez launched this commission with Decree 3,408.
2. [www.viacampesina.org](http://www.viacampesina.org)

### Chapter 14: Learning to Participate: The MST Experience in Brazil

1. Particularly important, among the literature that examines the significance and the viability of Brazilian land reform in that period, are the works that reflect the dynamics of the debate among intellectuals and worker leaders (Carvalho and da Conceição D’Incao 1982; CONTAG 1982; Figueredo 1984). During the so-called Nova Republica (New Republic), this debate intensified and the Campanha Nacional da Reforma Agraria (National Campaign for Agrarian Reform, or CNRA) was organized to coordinate the proposals and the popular mobilizations (CNRA 1987).

2. The UDR, the Brazilian rural entrepreneurs’ organization, was created in 1986 (Bruno 1987). Due to its violent methods, such as using hired gunmen and maintaining a private army to defend the rural property, it lost its political support in the 1990s. Its leader, Ronaldo Caiado, made a weak impression as a candidate in the 1990 presidential election.

3. Meetings start and end with the MST hymn and popular songs about the struggle for land, the alliance with the proletariat, and women’s participation. Before making decisions, members sometimes dramatize or draw “pictures of life,” and they use seeds to indicate their approval of statutes or to elect representatives, rather than raising their hands.

## Chapter 15: Regional Impacts of Land Reform in Brazil

1. This chapter summarizes some of the results of the study *Os impactos regionais da reform agrária: um estudo sobre áreas selecionadas* (The regional impacts of land reform: A study on selected areas), carried out from January 2000 through December 2001, by CPDA/UFRRJ and Nuap/PPGAS/MN/UFRRJ, with the financial support of Nead and IICA (Heredia et al. 2002). The study was headed by Beatriz Heredia (IFCS/UFRRJ), Leonilde Servolo de Medeiros (CPDA/UFRRJ), Moacir Palmeira (Nuap/PPGAS/MN/UFRRJ), Sérgio Leite (CPDA/UFRRJ), and Rosângela Cintrão. The summary, on which this article is based, was prepared by Rosângela Cintrão and John Comerford, under the orientation of the project coordinators, and can be found at [www.nead.gov.br](http://www.nead.gov.br).

2. The zones were also chosen taking into account the data from previous studies on the settlement projects, as well as the fact that there already are teams who have experience with studies on these regions. We avoided the regions already covered in the study *Impactos regionais dos assentamentos rurais: dimensões econômicas, políticas e sociais* (Regional impacts of rural settlements: Economic, political and social dimensions), which included the states of Acre, Mato Grosso, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, and Sergipe (Medeiros and Leite 2002). The coordinators of the regional teams were Aloísio Lopes Melo (Southeastern Para), Ana Cláudia Silva and Rodrigo de Ávila (Southern Bahia), José Ambrósio Ferreira Neto (Federal District and surrounding areas), César Barreira and Francisco Amaro de Alencar (Ceará Sertão), Emília de Rodat Moreira and Marilda Menezes (Northeastern Sugarcane Region), and Renato Maluf (Western Santa Catarina).

3. The choice of which municipalities would be studied in each zone was made with consideration of the fact that the sample should cover 10 percent of the settler families in each municipality and that 100 to 300 questionnaires should be administered in each zone, so that the final count for all zones should not be too much more than 1,500 questionnaires, representing 15,000 families settled there between 1985 and 1997.

4. A profile was drawn up for each settlement project to collect general information on the settlements. Not all projects implemented in a given state between 1985 and 1997 were included in the application of the questionnaires. Nonetheless, the sample of questionnaires covers 10 percent of the families settled in all of the projects. An ample questionnaire was administered to the person responsible for each plot of land (i.e., the person managing it; usually the head of the household, regardless of whether or not he or she was legally the owner). This ensured that each questionnaire represented one production family unit. The study also used qualitative interviews, with representatives of different local and regional institutions; geographic data; technical reports; and secondary data statistical sources.

5. Besides these, there was one case, in the Abelardo Luz Municipality (SC), in which the expropriation request initiative was taken by the local authorities, with no prior conflicts.

6. The only exception is the Western Santa Catarina zone, where many of the settlers used to live in other parts of the same state (29 percent), which may be

explained by the singularities of the struggle for the land in that region. In Federal District and Southeastern Pará there is a large percentage of settlers who were born in other states, which probably indicates that the settlements are receiving populations that had resulted from previous migrations. The lowest numbers of plot holders who used to live in rural areas are to be found in Federal District (62 percent) and Southern Bahia (66 percent) zones.

7. These figures represent the total number of working-age settlers, and therefore include both the plot holders and the other family members over the age of 14 at the time the settlement projects were created. The category "unpaid family members" includes people who worked with their parents (or other relatives), family farmers, and housewives.

8. Only plots inhabited by families with children are considered here.

9. The percentages of other relatives who lived in urban areas before going to the settlements were 52 percent in the zone of Federal District and surrounding areas, 42 percent in Southern Bahia, around 30 percent in the Sugarcane Region, 33 percent in Santa Catarina, and 22 percent in Ceará.

10. One good example occurred in the municipality of Paracatu, in the state of Minas Gerais: In 1996, before the settlements existed, there were 500 farms with an area smaller than 50 hectares (31.57 percent of the total number of farms and 1.8 percent of the total area). Adding to these figures the number and area of settlements established up to 1999, all of which stemmed from the dismemberment of properties larger than 1,000 hectares, we will observe an increase of 239.8 percent in the number of farms and of 400.48 percent in the total area, bringing their participation in the total overall number of farms in that municipality up to 52.52 percent of all farms and 7.39 percent of the area occupied by farms.

11. Another way of analyzing the impact of the settlements on land distribution would be to use the Gini-coefficient, which is a specific indicator. One of the greatest problems with using this indicator was the lapse between the last land census (1995–1996) and the period in which most of the settlements in the studied zones were established.

12. The idea was to establish a parallel between the rural settlement implementation process and the impact on the demographic and migratory dynamics in the studied regions, based on the population census analyses. However, this was met with difficulties because there was the risk of attributing to the settlements effects that would have occurred anyway or, inversely, of denying any participation of the settlements in the demographic changes because of the ampler dynamics presented.

13. These figures are, in fact, even worse, considering the dates on which the families effectively entered the project areas: then the average time until the development credit was received was four years after and the housing loans, five years. The figures for Western Santa Catarina considerably lowered the averages, perhaps because the farmers there had a greater capacity to exert pressure.

14. The longest average distances are in Federal District zones and surrounding areas (45 kilometers) and in Southeastern Pará (40 kilometers), but in the lat-

ter it takes much longer to get to the city (90 minutes versus 66 minutes for Federal District and surrounding areas).

15. In only four cases in the entire sample was a daily presence of doctors in the settlements reported. In most of the cases, they were reported to come in a few times a week; in seven settlements, once a month. The doctors who come in are usually general practitioners. In two cases isolated specialists were mentioned; one gynecologist and one pediatrician. Only one of the settlements (in the municipality of Goiana, in Pernambuco) enjoyed a full medical team, including general practitioner, pediatrician, gynecologist, and dentist.

16. Including those who only worked elsewhere and those who worked both on the plot and elsewhere.

17. Other reasons for departure included getting married (35 percent), going away for study (18 percent); the rest left for reasons due to health problems or to conflicts with the family or other settlers.

18. The GP was calculated by multiplying the total reported production by the prices in the different regions. It is an approximation, for not all of the products are sold, and the prices effectively charged by the settlers are not always the same as those in the rest of the region.

19. The GP for all animal products but milk and eggs could not be calculated because there were not enough data available for the year prior to the field study.

20. The data were extracted from the 1996 farming census and the PAM/PPM (Municipal Farming Study and Municipal Livestock Study, respectively), both conducted by the IBGE. There is a lapse between the years the data were collected (on the different harvests) and the IBGE census and sample studies. The latter are not specific enough regarding data on the settlements.

21. In the Pará zone, the significant participation of the total settlement area coupled to innovations and changes brought about by the settlements resulted in an important impact on the regional productive profile. Besides diversification and an increase in the offer of products for the local markets (including basic items such as rice, beans, cassava, and corn, for pork and poultry feed, as well as vegetables, fruit, poultry, forest products, and animal products), the settlers were responsible for the implementation of agro-industrial units that produced for the local markets (rice and dairy processing) and for the regional and national markets (dairy products, meat, and pineapple concentrate).

22. The productivity of each product was compared in each zone and in each municipality (by number of settlers who produce them, sell them, and consider them important, and by the product's participation in the GP), in a total 146 cases.

23. There are differences between zones: in the Ceará Sertão, 83 percent of the families received credit (however, this zone had the lowest average credit: 553.81 reals); in Southern Bahia only 43 percent of the families received credit (the average amount was 1,608.14 reals). The highest average amounts were received in Pará: 5,698.00 reals.

24. One example is a regional cooperative run with the help of the MST in Western Santa Catarina, in which commercial, credit, and agro-industrial activities

(for example, long-lasting milk) have great importance for the settlers' economic prospects.

25. Given the complexity involved in calculating the income per plot in a study such as this one (with an early deadline, large span of research, and in which income was just one of the elements analyzed), and in order not to make the questionnaire too long, it was decided that only items produced, items sold, and overall production would be asked. No data were collected on the amount sold, on the actual price charged during each season of the year in question, nor on production costs. Since the amount sold is the same as the total production, plot income (or income generation capacity) was calculated based on the average local prices (based on secondary statistics sources, such as the PAM/PPM). On one hand, this resulted in an overrated income estimate, since the entire production is not always sold (especially in the case of products that are both commercial and subsistence products) when calculating gross income (as production costs are not considered). On the other, there was an underrated estimate of income potential because products that are exclusively for subsistence were included, which balances out the end result.

#### Chapter 16: Conclusion.

#### Moving Forward: Agrarian Reform as a Part of Food Sovereignty

1. João Pedro Stédile, MST leader, personal communication, 2003.

