Rural-Urban Migration and the Stabilization of Cuban Agriculture
Lisa
Reynolds Wolfe, Ph.D.
ewolfe2@nyc.rr.com
Consultant’s
Report for Food First and Global Exchange
December
17, 2004
Abstract
This
report centers on the following questions: How has the
transformation of Cuba’s agriculture from a system based on
techniques associated with the “green revolution” to an
agroecological system affected food security in the island’s
cities? Has it been a factor in lessening the heightened rural-urban
migration of the 1990s? The report presents five findings,
concluding that urban and rural farmers outside of Cuba would be wise
to consider Cuban agricultural policy regarding the following: the
promotion of organic agricultural and forestry use of vacant
municipal, state, and private lands; recycling of all “green
waste” material into compost; and the creation of a variety of
markets for local produce.
Author’s
note: This report builds on work done on four previous
research trips to Cuba since 1997.
MAJOR
FINDINGS
Cuba’s
countryside has been stabilized – despite insufficient
rainfall and recurring drought in eastern areas – through the
introduction of agroecological techniques.Because
of the introduction of urban agriculture nationwide, urban
residents no longer are forced to rely primarily on rural areas for
fresh produce.
Small
farmers working on privately owned farms and in cooperatives have
made major contributions to the successful implementation of
agroecology in the countryside.
The
introduction of a diversified market based system for food
distribution has spurred increased productivity among agricultural
workers.
While
agroecological techniques hold great promise for rural areas
outside of Cuba, their successful implementation in other locales
is not assured.
Acknowledgments:
My gratitude to Food First and Global Exchange for sponsoring the
research delegation. A special thanks to Cuban colleagues for their
gracious hospitality at SIGA 2004.
INTRODUCTION
Seventy-four
percent of Cuba’s eleven million people now live in urban areas
largely due to heavy rural-urban migration. In 1956, 56 percent of
the population was rural. By 1989 that percentage had dropped to 28
percent. Therefore, the transformation of Cuban agriculture in
little more than a decade holds great promise for a world where
urbanization is thought to be out of control. The world’s
current population is split about equally between cities and rural
areas, with urban areas expected to surpass rural areas in population
around the year 2005. By 2015 about 26 cities in the world are
expected to have populations of 10 million or more. To feed cities
of this size today – for example, Tokyo, Sao Paulo or Mexico
City – at least 6,000 tons of food must be imported on a daily
basis. What guidance can the Cuban model provide an international
community looking for ways to address issues of food security in the
context of rampant urbanization? The findings of this report provide
insight. But, first, it is necessary to understand the background
driving Cuba’s agricultural transformation.
BACKGROUND
End
of the Cold War and Collapse of the Soviet Bloc
The
end of the Cold War meant the total collapse of Cuba’s
principal trade agreements with the Soviet Bloc. At the roughly the
same time that Cuba was coping with this crisis, the United States
tightened its economic blockade against the island. In 1992, the
Torricelli bill was approved, barring shipments of food and medical
supplies by overseas subsidiaries of US companies. In 1996, the
Helms-Burton
Act
restricted foreign investment in Cuba.
As
early as the late 1980s, the introduction of glasnost and
perestroika in the Soviet Union – along with the
democratization of Eastern Europe – led to Soviet unwillingness
and (eventually) inability to fulfil trade obligations. Because
Cuba’s economy was so intertwined with that of the Soviet
Union, the impact of change could not be gradual. Rather, it was a
shock that permeated every household in Cuba. The absence of oil
imports, especially, threatened the viability of the country’s
industrial, transportation, and agricultural infrastructures.
Under
agreements with the former Soviet Union, Cuba had been an oil driven
country, insensitive to energy conservation or efficiency. In fact,
98 percent of all Cuba’s petroleum had come from the Soviet
bloc. In 1988, for example, 12-13 million tons of Soviet oil were
imported and, of this total, the Cubans were able to re-export two
million tons onto the world market. In 1989, Cuba was forced to cut
the re-exports in half and, by 1990, oil exports were cut entirely
since only 10 of the 13 million tons promised by the Soviets had been
received. By the end of 1991, oil imports had fallen still more.
Cuba received only 6 million of a promised 13 million tons and, by
this time, the shortfall in oil and associated factors began to
severely impact the nation’s economy.
While
oil was critical, other losses were also important since 85 percent
of all exchanges (including agriculture) were with the Soviets. In
terms of exports, 66 percent of all sugar and 98 percent of the
country’s citrus fruits had been exported to the Soviet Bloc.
As for imports, aside from oil, 66 percent of the country’s
food, 86 percent of all raw material, and 80 percent of machinery and
spare parts came from Soviet dominated trading partners.
Consequently, when the support was withdrawn, factory closures became
common, food scarcity was widespread, and an already inadequate
technology base began eroding.
In
early 1990, a survival economy was put in place. Food became
increasingly scarce. This was not surprising since, as mentioned, 66
percent of all the island’s food had been brought in from the
Soviet bloc. In 1989 alone, 51 percent of all calories and 57
percent of all proteins had been imported. In early 1990, 100,000
tons of wheat normally obtained through barter arrangements failed to
arrive and the government was required to use scarce hard currency to
import grain from Canada. Bread rations were cut from 200 grams to
180 grams per person per day, and the price of a 400 gram loaf of
bread in Havana jumped from 30 to 35 cents. At the same time, the
price of eggs nearly doubled, increasing from 8 to 15 cents. Tens of
thousands of tons of citrus fruits that were to be exported were
diverted to domestic shelves at the expense of hard currency
earnings. By early 1992, the price of many foods – potatoes,
tomatoes, carrots, beets, and bananas – had doubled as pressure
mounted for the state to reduce its subsidies. Overall, food
consumption was said to show a decrease of 20 percent in calories and
27 percent in protein between 1989 and 1992.
Clearly
the Cuban population could not sustain life at such a minimal level
indefinitely. Nevertheless, Cuba’s leadership was determined
not to sacrifice the social and redistributional gains of the Cuban
revolution. They, therefore, decided to go beyond the survival
economy to a second stage which would, if successful, allow the
government to better living and working conditions. The strategy was
to concentrate on the three priorities which the government felt
could sustain the country and, at the same time, continue the
advances of the past thirty years. These priorities were
agriculture, acquisition of hard currency through tourism and
biotechnology, and continued Defense of the Revolution.
RURAL-URBAN
MIGRATION
Issues
associated with Cuban rural-urban migration have always been related
to problems associated with agriculture. Before the revolution, the
majority of investment in construction and services occurred in
Havana, spurring those seeking a better life to migrate to the
capital. In 1953, Havana’s net migration was 22,801, rising to
43,578 by 1959. With the success of the Cuban revolution, the new
government set out to reverse this trend by expanding opportunities
in rural areas. A number of specific measures including the First
Law of Agrarian Reform, the Second Law of Agrarian Reform, and
various bills dealing with Cuba’s housing emergency were
designed to redistribute income, eliminate rural-urban inequities,
and address the ‘urban crisis.’ At the same time, the
regime worked diligently to incorporate and mobilize the poor,
dispossessed, and unemployed. Since problems in the countryside were
considered to be the root cause of the urban crisis, the government
focused on what it called the ‘urbanizing of the countryside
and the ruralizing of the urban population’ through a process
of concentrating formerly dispersed inhabitants in small towns, and
building new cities and towns. It was hoped that improved conditions
in the countryside would make migration a less attractive
alternative.
Rural-urban
imbalances diminished a great deal during the decade of the 1960s,
although the demographic growth of Greater Havana continued until
1963. After this time, decentralization slowed the rate of Havana’s
annual population growth which had previously included the arrival of
17,000 immigrants from the interior of the country, others coming
from countries outside of Cuba, and a natural increase of 23,000.
Over the period from 1970-1980, Havana’s growth trends were the
reverse of other cities in Latin America and, indeed, in the Third
World as a whole. Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, despite Havana’s
slow growth policy, planners estimated that about 80,000 individuals
lived in Old Havana (alone), compared to approximately 70,000 at the
time of the revolution. More than one-half (40,000) of this number
are internal migrants. Of this group, one-fourth (10,000) arrived
between 1990 and 1995 when investment in Cuba’s rural areas
became more limited and migration to the capital increased once
again. By 1994, the net migration to Havana (as a whole) was 16,541
individuals, more than any year since 1963. By 1996, the figure had
reached 28,193 migrants and was, thus, at the pre-revolutionary
level. The reason was clear. As one migrant stated: “Since
the start of the special period things have gotten really
tough back east . . . There are shortages of food and medicine and
gasoline there, and that is what has driven us here. We’re
desperate to improve our situation.”
Obviously,
there has been a great deal of concern over both the increase in
rural-urban migration, and a continuing trend suggesting that
internal migration is escalating rapidly, with larger numbers of
internal migrants than in the past setting their sights on the
capital city of Havana. This is in direct contrast to much of the
revolutionary period when migrants chose to settle in secondary
cities or small towns rather than in the capital itself. There has
also been concern over an emerging trend which indicates that
migrants are beginning to leave closely adjacent provinces –
and even outlying counties of Havana Province – for the
capital. This, again, is in contrast to the more geographically
distant origins of prior arrivals, and suggests a diminishing of jobs
and services even for those living fairly close to the core of the
city itself. Consequently, for a time in the mid 1990s, it appeared
that, in a period of scarcity, pre-revolutionary patterns were
reasserting themselves. In fact, the trends discussed above were
most probably understated because many newcomers avoid registering
their move with the appropriate authorities.
Policies
to stem the inflow were put in place in 1997, but not before the
average population density in the capital reached 3,000 inhabitants
per square kilometer compared to 2,200 inhabitants per square
kilometer at the time of the revolution. And, while restrictions of
1997 worked to contain the increased movement of individuals from the
countryside to the city, it is clear that the transformation of Cuban
agriculture, in both the countryside and the cities, has had
significant impact.
This
report concludes that two methodologies, in tandem, have worked to
stabilize both urban and rural areas, with positive affect on the
problem of rural-urban migration and on food security in both rural
and urban environments. The innovations are first, an organically
based urban agriculture; and, second, the introduction of
agroecological techniques in the countryside. This report will now
present findings which will be stated and discussed.
FINDING
#1: Cuba’s countryside has been stabilized – despite
insufficient rainfall and recurring drought in eastern areas –
through the introduction of agroecological techniques.
Largely
due to necessity, agroecological methods have been introduced into
Cuba’s rural communities. However, while acknowledging
necessity, it is important to note that the appropriation of
substantial government resources, state supported research, and
fundamental policy shifts at the highest levels of government have
supported the movement.
The
collapse of trade with the Soviet Bloc required Cuba to adopt an
alternative approach to agricultural production. Methods were
introduced that emphasized an input substitution approach, relying
heavily on locally produced biopesticides and biofertilizers to make
up for a lack of imported inputs. However, the Cuban interpretation
of agroecology goes well beyond the use of low-input technologies to
minimize dependency on external inputs. The emphasis is on the
design of complex agrosystems that take advantage of ecological
interactions, and synergisms between biotic and abiotic compounds
which enable soil fertility enhancement, biological pest control, and
higher productivity to be achieved through internal processes.
Today, hundreds of Cuban farms are managed using the concepts of
agroecology which include: increased recycling of nutrients and
biomass within the system; addition of organic matter to improve soil
quality and activate soil biology; soil and water conservation to
minimize resource losses; diversification of agrosystems in time and
place, including the integration of crops and livestock; optimization
of biological interactions and synergisms among functional components
of biodiversity to provide key ecological services; and integration
of farm components to increase biological efficiencies and preserve
the productive capacity of the agroecosystem.
NOTE:
Each technique listed below was observed while traveling on the Food
First/Global Exchange research delegation. Various methods will be
discussed in more detail in sections of this report dealing with site
visits.
The
diversification of agroecosystems is a key strategy. Cubans have
used a variety of techniques such as crop rotations, green manures,
polycultures, agroforestry, and crop-livestock integration. The
challenge is to discover the most efficient crop, tree, and animal
combinations that match the environmental potential of each area.
This process is dependent on the application of agroecological
concepts and principles including: the optimization of local
resources and promotion of within-farm synergisms through
plant-animal combinations; reliance on the ecological services of
biodiversity in order to minimize the use of external inputs, whether
organic or conventional; matching cropping systems with existing soil
and climatic potential; conservation and use of crop and non-crop
biodiversity within and around farms to maximize utilization of
biological and genetic resources; reliance on the knowledge and
wisdom of local farmers as a key input; and promotion of
participatory methods in research and in the extension and
implementation process. A good example of the above is the UBPC,
Maniabo, a worker-owned cooperative enterprise that allowed us
to see the principles of agroecology in practice.
(The
discussion on agroecology relied on information presented in two
chapters of the Food First Book Sustainable Agriculture and
Resistance: “The Principles and Strategy of Agroecology in
Cuba” and “Lessons of Cuban Resistance.“)
Site
Visit: UBPC Maniabo
Maniabo
is a Basic Unit of Cooperative Production (UBPC) located in
the municipality of Las Tunas. Its 248 workers, including 42 women,
are former state farm workers, each earning between 600-700 Cuban
pesos monthly, a high salary by Cuban standards. The facility was
founded on December 17, 1993 and, since its inception, it
has had high levels of productivity. Its first priority is milk
production. With a total area of 1,369 hectares, it has 1,549 cows
that produced a total of 1,440,700 liters of milk in 2003. The milk
is picked up twice daily as there is no onsite refrigeration.
Maniabo
is characterized by diversified production. During 2003, in
addition to milk from cows, it produced livestock, eggs, various
vegetable crops, and worm compost. Red beans are raised as a
monocrop, with the growing area rotated to a different crop yearly.
And, while the main focus of the farm is dairy, the farmers try to
grow as much of their own food as possible.
The
cooperative is particularly proud of its pedestal
technology, an intensive rotational pasture system. (See
Cuba2004 036, 037) This technology increases the surface area for
cattle grazing by integrating grazing areas and legume cultivation.
Because the grasses reseed, resowing is not necessary. Because of
prolonged insufficient rainfall in Las Tunas province (only 400
millimeters of rain have fallen so far this year compared to
1100-1200 millimeters in a normal year), both bermuda grass and high
producing legumes require intensive irrigation. The area is irrigated
for three hours every seven days all year round. Gravity driven
rainwater catchment technology is employed as is scientific
methodology designed to measure the amount of food and water given
each cow relative to the amount of milk produced.
Farm
workers are also proud of their worm composting production. Cow
manure is used to feed the earthworms. The resultant compost is
mixed into the soil or used as top dressing on the farm, but the worm
humus also provides additional income through sales to tobacco and
vegetable farmers in the area. There is also high demand for the
product from urban agriculture producers in the city. The compost is
sold in both Cuban and convertible pesos, selling for about $14.00 US
dollars. (See Cuba2004 038,040)
Conclusion:
Integrated production provides a more rational use of natural
resources and is more effective in reducing external dependencies
than other agricultural techniques.
FINDING
#2: Because of the introduction of urban agriculture nationwide,
urban residents no longer are forced to rely primarily on rural areas
for fresh produce.
In
1990 (as in 1960), the government’s first obligation was to
feed the Cuban people. Since agriculture had been centered around
state enterprises designed on the oil-driven Soviet model, a
revamping of the country’s agricultural system was necessary in
order to make up for the absence of the petroleum-based products
previously used in agriculture.
As
previously mentioned, throughout the 1960s, there had been an effort
to ruralize Cuba’s urban areas and urbanize the countryside in
order to make cities more self-sufficient in food production. This
strategy was abandoned – especially in Havana – when the
capital regained renewed importance during the decade of the 1970s.
With expanded Soviet patronage and an ample supply of oil,
agriculture was increasingly mechanized and petroleum reliant. Even
the provision of adequate quantities of fertilizer, pesticides,
herbicides, and seeds was a function of the Cuban relationship with
the Soviet bloc. As one Cuban noted, “we traded sugar for
everything else.”
In
1990, when the regime began to lay out an agricultural strategy based
on smaller units of production, the new tactics began to impact
Havana almost immediately. For example, seventeen organiponics
(organic farms) were developed in which manure and animal
traction were used in the cultivation process. Meanwhile, idle lands
in the metropolitan area were brought under cultivation at the
community level, and land associated with the workplace was also
farmed. All these changes were a concerted attempt to alleviate the
transportation costs that were required to bring food produced in the
provinces to Havana. The program also sought to divert workers
displaced in other sectors to the agricultural sector. For instance,
thousands of state employees in the construction and agricultural
ministries were reassigned to state farms in 1991 and early 1992.
Efforts were moderately successful and, by March 1992, there were
significant increases in the availability of vegetables and some
fruits in Havana where “over 20,000 residents were mobilized to
harvest and supplement distribution.”
Nevertheless,
while early attempts at agricultural diversification (sugar cane
versus all other crops) and cultivation for self-consumption were
said to be encouraging, they were not sufficient to ensure that every
urban resident had an adequate food supply. Consequently, in 1994,
the government allowed the implementation of radical measures by
revolutionary standards, re-introducing private farmers’
markets that would enable producers to sell their goods at whatever
price the market would bear. By early 1995, a wide variety of high
quality food products began to circulate on the private market as
producers responded to the stimulus. In fact, many products which
hadn’t been seen for decades were suddenly available for those
who could afford to purchase them, most often a privileged group made
up of those individuals with links to the dollar economy.
The
urban agriculture that we observed on the Food First/Global Exchange
research trip falls into a variety of distinct production systems.
Organiponics
and Intensive Vegetable Gardening: These two systems have been
the most important methods used in past years. Organiponics are
generally located in areas with infertile soils or with production
constraints. They are often built on artificial surfaces in raised
beds filled with a mixture of organic matter substrate and soil. The
intensive vegetable garden, on the other hand, is developed on
parcels of relatively good soil without using raised beds. Organic
matter is applied directly during preparation for planting.
(Picture?)
Small
Plots, Patios, and Popular Gardens: Here, the area cultivated is
very small and is determined by how much useful or arable space
exists between buildings, houses, and streets, or in a patio, or a
state-owned urban space that can be converted to gardens. At this
point, there are over 104,000 parcels and patios under production,
covering an area of more than 3,600 hectares. These areas produce
more than organiponics and intensive gardens combined. The small
plots, patios, and popular gardens have had positive impact. They
have made it possible to feed the urban population, spurring
development of an urban culture favorable to agriculture and
eliminating the abandoned spaces which in the past may have been
breeding grounds for disease vectors and rodents. Also of
importance, they have provided socially useful and productive
employment opportunities.
(The
above discussion on production systems in urban agriculture relies
heavily on the chapter “The Growth of Urban Agriculture”
in the Food First book “Sustainable Agriculture and
Resistance. Each type of production activity was observed while
traveling on the Food First/Global Exchange research delegation.)
In
sum, urban agriculture enhances the quality and sufficiency of food
for the urban farmer and his family, providing supplemental income as
well. It reduces food insecurity by increasing access to fresh,
nutrient rich foods among populations suffering from food insecurity.
This is accomplished both through self-provisioning and by using what
is grown to increase income. In addition, urban agriculture provides
employment and income opportunities for the urban population –
including migrants from the countryside– and an improved urban
environment overall.
Site
Visit: As we observed on our site visit to the home of Basillo
Bernal Mayea (Bebo) in Sancti Spiritus, small backyard and patio
gardens now make significant contributions to household and regional
food supplies. In addition to supplying his family’s food
requirements, Bebo has an organic “juice bar” on his
front porch which generates additional income for the family. He
also hosts a weekly radio program on permaculture. (See
Cuba2004 088, 089, 091)
Self-Provisioning
at Factories, Offices, and Businesses: Urban areas in Cuba host
hundreds of workers’ cafeterias associated with the workplace.
The facilities require large quantities of agricultural products.
Many of them have organized agricultural production in areas
bordering, or close to, their facilities. In Havana alone, there are
more than 300 such farms in production. Large quantities of
vegetables, root crops, grains, and fruits, as well as meat, milk,
fish, eggs, and herbs are produced.
Suburban
Farms: This form of agricultural production is characterized by
intensive cultivation, efficiency of water use, and the maximum
reduction of agrotoxins. Suburban farms have reached an important
level in the past few years, especially in the cities of Havana,
Santa Clara, Sancti Spiritus, Camaguey, and Santiago de Cuba. They
were quite visible from the windows of our bus as we passed by.
Shaded
Cultivation and Apartment-Style Production: Shaded
cultivation is in the initial stages of development. It will allow
the year-round cultivation of horticultural crops, especially during
the hottest months of the year when the sun is at its most intense.
Apartment style agriculture is very diverse. It includes a range of
practices, including cultivation with diverse soil substrate and
nutrient solutions, mini-planting beds, small containers, balconies,
roofs, etc., with minimal use of soil.
State
resolutions require that all urban agriculture must be organic so as
to protect neighborhood residents and that livestock cannot be raised
in urban areas. Through a series of urban agricultural stores, the
state supplies organic inputs (primarily compost) and extension
services. The urban agriculture movement has met with great
success. According to Oxfam America (June 2001), half of the fresh
produce consumed in Havana is grown by “nontraditional urban
producers.” Production levels of vegetables have doubled or
tripled every year since 1994, and urban gardens now produce about 60
percent of all vegetables consumed in Cuba, but only 50 percent of
all vegetables consumed in Havana. Moreover, urban agriculture alone
(not counting small gardens and individual farms) provides 215 grams
of vegetables per day per person throughout Cuba – more than 70
percent of the grams recommended by the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization. At the end of 1999, prices at vegetable
stands supplied by urban producers were generally at 30 to 50 percent
of farmers market prices. (Various types of markets will be discussed
in Finding #4 of this report.)
Conclusion:
The urban agriculture movement in Cuba has made a significant
contribution to food security in cities and has provided employment
for many urban residents.
FINDING
#3: Small farmers working on privately owned farms and in
cooperatives have made major contributions to the successful
implementation of agroecology in the countryside.
NOTE:
While a variety of organizational models exist, including the truly
independent farmer who is not a member of a cooperative, this report
will only discuss the Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPC),
Agricultural Production Cooperative or CPA, and the Credit and
Service Cooperative or CCS.
In
order to understand the importance of small farms in Cuba today, some
background is necessary. In September 1993, the Cuban government
unveiled a major reorganization of agriculture, restructuring state
farms as private cooperatives. At the time, Fidel Castro said, “The
state has not had success in the large farm business.” The new
farms (which now make up the largest sector in Cuban agriculture)
were called UBPCs or Basic Units of Cooperative Production. Policy
change was based on a growing perception that smaller farms would be
more easily managed and better able to take on the sustainable
agriculture practices that now seemed necessary. Reorganization was
meant to promote decentralized decision-making regarding production
that would, at the same time, allow centralized planning in areas of
biological diversity, pest control, and water and other resource
management. Still in operation today, UBPCs (like Maniabo in
Las Tunas) are smaller than the previous state farms. They are also
member-owned and member-managed. The cooperative, not the state,
owns production, and the cooperative member’s earnings are
based on his or her share of the cooperative’s income. The
UBPC also owns buildings and farm equipment, purchased from the
government at discounted prices with long-term, low interest loans (4
percent). The greatest structural difference between UBPCs and the
other farms that we will discuss is that the state retains ownership
of the land, leasing it on a long-term basis, rent-free. Also, most
UBPCs produce sugar. They are given quotas for sugar production,
limiting any other crops that they might produce. Therefore, they
have little to sell in the agricultural markets, a fact which
restricts their options and their income. In addition to UBPCs, the
breakup of large state farms has freed large plots of land for other
types of use, and the government has turned over land to both private
farmers and agricultural cooperatives.
Today,
the private sector occupies a central place in agricultural
production. Agricultural Production Cooperatives or CPAs are the
traditional revolutionary form of cooperative production in Cuba.
They were first created 20 to 30 years ago by farmers who voluntarily
chose to unite their private individual lands and resources in order
to attain increased production along with marketing and economic
efficiency. Although for some time the CPAs were of minimal
importance, they began to rebound in the early 1990s as new members
joined, drawn to farming by the advantages of rural cooperative life
with respect to income, access to affordable food, and housing. CPAs
served as models for the creation of UBPCs since their yields have
been greater than those of the state farms. Internal organization is
similar to that of UBPCs, but their management techniques tend to be
more advanced and, as noted above, they own their own land.
The
Credit and Service Cooperative (CCS) is an association of small
landowners who own and manage individual plots, joining with other
small farmers to receive credit and services from state agencies.
They may also share certain machinery and equipment and, thus, are
able to take advantage of economies of scale for certain activities.
CCS members purchase inputs and sell products at fixed prices through
state agencies, based on production plans and contracts established
with the state distribution system. Any production above and beyond
the contracted quantity may be sold in farmers’ markets at free
market prices. These small farmers have been the most productive
sector in Cuban agriculture, outperforming both agricultural
cooperatives (CPAs) and UBPCs. CCS farmers also have higher incomes
than members of other cooperatives. Because these small farmers
produce more with less, the National Association of Small Producers
(ANAP) began a program in 1998 to strengthen the business side of the
co-ops. They are now able to open bank accounts, hire administrators
and market representatives, and negotiate credit. In addition to the
Maniabo UBPC discussed earlier, our delegation was able to tour both
CPAs and CCSs.
Site
Visits: We visited two independent family farms in Sancti Spiritus.
The first was on a steep hillside on land given to the owner during
an agrarian reform after the revolution. The second had been the
property of the owner’s grandfather. Thus, it had been in the
family for a substantial period of time. Both farms used
agroecological principles. However, the two farms were not equally
prosperous. Although it was clear that there were vast differences
in CCSs, both farmers were clearly proud of the work that they were
doing, and proud of the contribution they were making to agroecology
in Cuba.
Farm
#1: The first impression upon arrival was of precautions taken
against the spread of disease. Before entering the farm area, the
soles of our feet and our hands were treated with a chloride
solution. (See Cuba2004 070) The eighteen year old farm was
worked by three family members. It had been organic for nine years.
The owners had altered their farming methodology because they were
achieving inadequate yields under the ‘old’ system. The
landscape is inhospitable, marked by steep landscapes and erosion.
Yet the owner is proud of the integrated planting of crops, including
pumpkin, maize, and beans. The small organiponic produces vegetables
and herbs for family use – plantains, yucca, rice, corn, and
coffee. The farm also produces nine kinds of fruit as well as both
fowl and cattle (for both milk and beef). Impressively, the farmers
were working under hardship conditions having had only one third
normal rainfall for the year. They had a well which reached down
eight meters and was used for irrigation. (See Cuba2004 069, 072,
073, 074, 075, 076, 077))
Farm
#2: This farm, established in 1888 by the owner’s grandfather,
was a family farm worked by seven individuals. The seven hectare
farm raised four crops including tobacco, had pasture land, raised
fruits, and contained forestry. It was not totally agroecological as
this technology is not possible with tobacco. It did practice crop
rotation, as well as raising herbs for green medicine, and providing
bat fertilizer. The firm also practiced biodynamic farming, a type
of farming based on the cycles of the moon. (See Cuba2004 078,
079, 080, 081,082, 085, 086)
Conclusion:
The small farmer on privately owned land has become the backbone of
Cuba’s agroecological movement. He is more efficient and more
productive than either UBPCs or state farms. He is also more
prosperous than most other Cuban workers.
FINDING
#4: The introduction of a diversified market-based system for food
distribution has spurred increased productivity among
agricultural workers.
Before
1995 the government was in charge of nearly 100 percent of food
distribution, primarily through the libreta or the ration card
system and through meals provided in the workplace. Since the onset
of the Special Period, monthly rations have been reduced and now last
no longer than ten days to two weeks. In response, agricultural
markets and other venues for buying food have emerged. While all
farmers continue to sell a percentage of their produce to the state
marketing board, farmers who contract a plan with the government are
now motivated to produce in excess of their agreed upon quota. They
can sell any food produced over and above their plan amount to the
agricultural markets at ‘differentiated prices’, often
twice the contracted government price. This provides a powerful
production incentive. In fact, under this incentive, almost all
farmers have been able to produce in excess of agreed upon amounts.
In many instances, they triple or quadruple their income.
Historically,
distribution and marketing of agricultural commodities to the
population at reasonable prices has been the responsibility of the
state. Although state markets still play a primary role, farmers’
markets established in 1994, allow farmers to sell their production
surpluses at prices set by supply and demand. The ability to get
higher prices and raise incomes by surpassing contracted production
quotas has led to a more active and efficient management of
productive resources, resulting in greater availability of food to
the population. The new markets motivate both private and
cooperative farmers. Vegetable stands that market fresh produce from
urban agriculture plots or oganiponics are also popular. Produce
sold at these stands is usually organic, fresh daily, and prices are
40-50 percent of those charged in the larger agricultural markets.
Variety is limited to what the garden is able to produce.
In
Cuba, gains in food production stem largely from increasing
productivity rather than from increasing land under cultivation.
Increased production reflects a reorientation of Cuban agriculture to
produce more food for domestic consumption in addition to its export
crops. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
productivity increases include:
a
tripling of the production of tubers and plantains from 1994 to
1999a
doubling of vegetable production from 1994 to 1998 and then again
in 1999
an
increase in potato production from 188,000 metric tons in 1994 to
330,000 metric tons in 1998
a
rise in cereal production from 300,818 metric tons in 1994 to
551,000 metric tons in 1998
an
increase in bean yields of 60 percent and citrus by 110 percent
from 1994 to 1999.
Productivity
improvements mentioned above have only been possible because the
government – in tandem with farmers/workers – has been
willing to alter previous policy and provide substantial resources
to farmers. And, notably, all sectors have not performed well. For
example, animal-sourced protein production has lagged:
beef
has increased only 16 percent from its low point in 1994pork
and chicken have increased only 2 percent from 1994
egg
production declined by 16 percent until 1998 and then increased 24
percent in 1999
milk
production has increased only 3 percent since bottoming out in
1994.
The
required reorienting of animal production through native breeds and
locally produced feeds is a long term process that requires
considerable patience. However, it is also important to note that
market reforms largely have not applied to animal production because
milk, chicken, beef, and eggs cannot be sold in the agricultural
markets.
(Statistics
in this section have been drawn from Cuba Going Against the
Grain: Agricultural Crisis and Transformation, Oxfam America,
2001.)
Conclusion:
The increased variety of markets along with the ability to purchase
goods in different currencies – first the US dollar, now the
Cuban convertible peso as well as the Cuban peso – has
increased the demand for farmers’ products. Increased
efficiency and productivity in the countryside have enabled farmers
to supply goods to diversified markets.
FINDING
#5: While agroecological techniques may hold great promise for rural
areas outside of Cuba, their successful implementation in other
locales is not assured.
Inherent
in this finding are two related questions. First, is the Cuban
agroecological model sustainable? Second, is the model universally
applicable? Regarding the first question, interviews and
discussions with agricultural professionals and ordinary Cubans
provoke a mixed response. While some firmly believe that the model
is in Cuba to stay, more are hopeful, but also doubtful. Some
assert that Cuba will never be able feed more than 50 percent of its
population. They note that agroecological techniques have allowed
Cuba to move past its agricultural crisis, but also suggest that
there are structural limits to the growth of the newly implemented
model. They say that Cuba has the land, but not the labor force,
for a full-scale, long term transformation to agroecology and that
labor shortages may be a limiting factor. Also, there is a feeling
that the ability to import food freely and inexpensively from
outside Cuba might also undermine commitment to sustainable
methodologies. In essence, policy changes may well result from
greater global economic integration. On the other hand, others
argue that if Cuba’s organic products can be certified as 100
percent organic, a niche market can be created that is reliant on
the export of organic produce. Therefore, the sustainability of the
Cuban agroecological model may depend on factors external to Cuba as
well as on internal forces and policies.
If
we are unsure that the Cuba model is internally sustainable, how can
we know if it is replicable? Cuba is not alone in the perception
that biodiversity is more than just a conservation strategy. And
Cuba has engaged in outreach efforts to farmers from a variety of
countries, educating them on the concept of biodiversity as a
production strategy. Adoption of the concept is not all that is
required, however. Cuba’s revolutionary agrarian reforms
allowed the breakup of large state farms into smaller parcels that
were given to local citizens who had the will and determination to
carve out an agricultural life. Few countries have the political
will to implement such far reaching change. Nor is it certain that
policies supporting the social aspects of the Cuban model are
easily implemented: cooperatives, health and education
infrastructure, culture, and pride of work. Other changes are also
controversial: control of market forces, limits on imports to
protect domestic production, and the gradual implementation of
reforms. Overall, few countries invested in human capital or in
rural infrastructure to the degree which Cuba has. And, for those
countries who rely on international financial institutions for
investment, the outlook is even more bleak. For these institutions
do not support the Cuban development strategy.
Finally,
the Cuban transformation has relied heavily on its educated workers
as well as on a modernized countryside. As mentioned previously,
the urbanization of rural areas was a top revolutionary priority.
Along with electrification and modernized housing came access to the
means of production, economic stability, services, cultural
development and, especially, education and training. During the
first decade of the revolution, the government attempted to
modernize farming through mechanization and professionalization. It
also tackled infrastructure, building paved roads, providing
electricity and running water, improving transportation, and
building warehouses and food distribution centers. Clinics and
schools appeared as did stores selling consumer goods, and farmers
began to improve and stabilize their incomes under the new
conditions. Above all, a sense of pride in Cuba’s
accomplishments emerged, and being Cuban became an individual’s
primary identity. Education and identity have been critical factors
in the transformation of Cuban agriculture in the 1990s. They have
provided a framework within which new policies, new actors, and new
agricultural systems gained acceptance and were implemented. Cuban
agriculture is something very different and the extent to which its
model is applicable elsewhere is unknown. Conclusion: Given
specific factors embedded in the Cuban paradigm, more research –
certainly comparative research evaluating agroecological efforts in
other countries – is necessary before universality questions
surrounding the Cuban model can be adequately addressed.
CONCLUSION
The
stabilization of the agricultural crisis in the Cuban countryside
has led to increased food security in Cuba’s cities. The
challenge of supplying nutritionally adequate and safe food to city
dwellers is a substantial one. While the problem has been addressed
to some extent by the establishment and growth of urban agriculture,
this, in itself, is insufficient. The frontiers between urban and
rural activity blur and merge, and acknowledging the linkages
between the two present opportunities for beneficial changes.
Issues affecting urban agriculture are also central to agriculture
in the countryside and vice versa. These include: land use and
tenure; management of water resources; food safety and health;
erosion control; and marketing issues. At the core are agronomic
issues: the use of efficient small-scale irrigation systems and
practices; safe and affordable pest control; sustainable soil
nutrient management; recycling and use of waste materials; and the
integration of integrated production systems including forestry.
During
the Special Period Cuba has, of necessity, addressed each of the
above issues. Consequently, many Cubans now view farming quite
differently than before the food crisis of the early 1990s.
Anecdotal information suggests that thousands of families have left
cities and large towns to make their livelihood from the land.
Other information suggests that thousands of unemployed –
including rural migrants – have found employment in
organiponics and other forms of urban agriculture. Has the
transformation of agriculture proved a deterrent to migration to the
cities? This question requires more concentrated research.
The
recent delegation sponsored by Food First and Global Exchange
provided assurance that many agricultural sectors have rebounded
from their collapse in the early 1990s. While sustainability and
replicability of the Cuban model are questions that history will
decide, it is safe to conclude that both urban and rural farmers
outside of Cuba would be wise to consider Cuban agricultural policy
regarding the following: the promotion of organic agricultural and
forestry use of vacant municipal, state, and private lands;
recycling of all “green waste” material into compost;
and the creation of a variety of markets for local produce.






